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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Its 
Impact on Law Enforcement.
FRANCES McGINN*
In response to expressed concern about the impact that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms will have on law enforcement, 
the author, by examining the enforcement proirisicns and search or 
seizure provision o f the Charter, identifies the reasons fo r  such concern 
and concludes that it is justified.
En réponse, à l ’inquiétude manifesté par rapport à l’impact qu’aura 
la Charte Canadienne des Droits et Libertés sur les recours de la 
loi, l’auteur à examiné les sections dans la Charte se rapportant aux 
recours, des fouilles, perquisitions et saisies. Il en est venu à la 
conclusion que l ’inquiétude manifesté à ce sujet est justifié.
INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Charter o f Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) will soon 
become law as part o f the Constitution of Canada.1 One concern presently 
being expressed is in regard to the future impact o f the Charter on law 
enforcement and the administration of justice in the country.2 In this 
article the enforcement mechanism provided by section 243 of the Charter 
will be examined with a view to making an objective determination as to 
the need for the expressed concern. Although section 24 provides a 
remedy for the infringement of any right guaranteed by the Charter, its 
application will be considered only in the context of an infringement of
•B.A. (U.N.B.), LL.B. Candidate (U.N.B.).
‘T he Charter is contained in the Canada Act, presently before the British House o f Lords, which is an 
Act to give effect to a request to amend the Constitution of Canada by enacting that the Constitution 
Act, 1981 shall have the force o f law in Canada. The request was made by the Senate and House of 
Commons of Canada in a Joint Address to H er Majesty.
’T he December 19, 1981 issue o f the Saint John Telegraph Journal reported the concern o f Staff Sargeant 
John Bamstead, staff relations representative for the R.C.M.P.’s New Brunswick Division, about the 
effect on law enforcement o f sections 24 and 8 o f the Charter.
*24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed o r denied 
may apply to a court o f competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a 
m anner that infringed o r denied any rights o r freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall 
be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in 
proceedings would bring the administration o f justice into disrepute.
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the right to security against unreasonable search or seizure as provided 
by section 8.4
This article is divided into three principal parts. In the first part, 
section 24 is considered in light of the enforcement mechanisms provided 
for violations o f rights under the American Bill of Rights5 and the Canadian 
Bill of Rights. 6 Consideration is also given to the development of the 
Charter provision through the drafting process. In the second part, the 
scope of section 8 and the existing Canadian law of search and seizure 
are examined. In the third part, consideration is given to the application 
of section 24 with particular attention given to possible guidelines for 
determ ining when the administration of justice may be brought into 
disrepute.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT PROVISION OF 
THE CHARTER
T he M inutes o f Proceedings o f the  Jo in t C om m ittee on the 
Constitution7 record references to the American experience under the 
American Bill of Rights8 and the Canadian experience under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights9 as the Joint Committee developed the remedy provision 
contained in the final version of the Charter. A general understanding 
of the remedies available under those documents contributes to an ap­
preciation of the Charter remedies.
The American Bill of Rights
The American Bill of Rights is a declarative document giving recog­
nition to rights therein declared, but providing no sanctions for a viola­
tion of those rights.10 Judicially created mechanisms were developed as 
the courts attempted to enforce constitutional rights, but it was not until 
1914, 125 years after the Constitution was affirmed, that the exclusion
‘Everyone- has the right to be secure against unreasonable search o r seizure.
JU. S. Constitution.
•R. S. C. 1970, App. III.
’Special Joint Committee o f the Senate and the House of Commons on the Constitution o f Canada 
respecting: the docum ent entitled “Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to H er Majesty the Queen
respecting the Constitution of Canada.” published bv the Federal Government on October 2, 1980. The 
Joint Committee heard representations concerning the proposed Charter from November 6, 1980, to 
February 13, 1981 and drew up the draft of the Charter which was adopted by the House of Commons, 
December 2, 1981, House o f Commons Debates, Vol. 124, 1st session 32nd Parliament.
"Miuutes of Proceedings, November 27, 1980, Vol. 14 at 22.
"Minutes of Proceedings, November 18, 1980, Vol. 7 at 15.
,#Sw/»ra, footnote 5.
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of illegally obtained evidence was applied as a remedy. In Weeks v. United 
States,11 the appellant had been convicted on evidence which had been 
obtained by a United States marshal who had searched the appellant’s 
home while he was at work and who had held neither an arrest warrant 
nor a warrant to search the premises. An application made before trial 
to the Federal District Court of Missouri for the return of the seized 
property was denied, the court holding that m atter pertinent to the 
offence could be retained and used as evidence.12 The Supreme Court 
of the United States ordered the property returned. Day J. stated as part 
of the judgm ent:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused o f  an offense, the protection o f  the 4th 
Am endm ent, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and 
seizures is o f  no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might 
as well be stricken from the Constitution.13
The exclusionary rule established by the decision in Weeks applied 
only to the Federal government and its agencies.14 As the rule developed 
in response to infringements of Fourth Amendment guarantees15 it was 
adopted by some states, but by 1949 the courts o f thirty states had 
considered the doctrine and rejected it.16 The issue of whether the 
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary 
rule applied to those thirty states came before the United States Supreme 
Court in Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado. 17 The Court held that 
although the Fourth Amendment guarantee was part o f the law of these 
states by way of the Fourteenth Am endm ent18, the exclusionary rule was 
not. Frankfurter J., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:
We cannot brush aside the experience o f  States which deem the incidence o f  
such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by 
way o f  disciplinary measures, but by overriding the relevant rules o f evi­
dence.1*




ltSupra, footnote 5: The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.........
'•W o lfv . People o f  Colorado, 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949) at 1367.
"Ibtd.
"14 th  Amendment (1 8 6 8 )...  nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, o r property without 
due process o f law.
'*Supra, footnote 16, at 1364.
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Mertens and Wasserstrom describe the period following the decision 
in W olf as one of “intolerable tension between state and federal law”20. 
The cause of the tension they describe as follows:
As the federal courts continued to expand the range o f  fourth amendment 
protections in the course o f  deciding exclusionary rule cases, the gap between 
federal and state privacy rights began to widen. In those states whose courts 
did not apply the exclusionary rule, the privacy rights protected by the fourth 
and fourteenth amendments remained undeveloped. As a result, while federal 
law enforcement agencies responded by modifying investigatory practices to 
conform to evolving fourth amendment standards, in states without an exclu­
sionary rule egregious and premeditated official misconduct continued;. . .
In 1961 the ambivalency resulting from the Wolf decision was re­
solved by the Supreme Court decision in Mapp v. Ohio.22 Miss Mapp had 
been convicted of having in her possession “certain lewd, and lascivious 
books, pictures and photographs” contrary to a state statute. The evidence 
on which the conviction was based had been obtained by police officers 
who had forcibly entered her home in search of a person wanted in 
connection with a bombing. During the search, which included a trunk 
in the basement and her personal papers, Miss Mapp was handcuffed 
and refused access to her lawyer who was at the door of the house. The 
Court described the facts of the case as showing “the casual arrogance 
of those who have the untrammelled power to invade one’s home . . .”23, 
and held the sanction to be “that all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inad­
missible in a state court”.24
Although the right to security against unreasonable search and sei­
zure had been part of state law,25 the imposition of the exclusionary rule 
in the thirty states which had been admitting illegally obtained evidence 
caused “grumbling in police ranks”,26 a response being echoed in the 
current Canadian experience.27 Michael J. Murphy, former Police Com­
missioner of New York State, writing four years after the Mapp decision, 
provided a basis for understanding the police response:
**“T he Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law," 
(1981) 70 Georgetown L. J. 365 at 380.
"Ibid.




••Yale Kamisar, “ Is the exclusionary rule an ‘illogical o r unnatural’ interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment?" (1978-79) 62 Judicature 67 at 68.
’ ’Staff Sergeant Bamstead, supra, footnote 2, described the Charier as a "criminal’s best friend”, and 
expressed his concern that the “constitutional resolution was passed and sent to London with no 
satisfactory explanation o f its implications on law enforcement and the administration of justice”.
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I can think o f  no decision in recent times in the field o f  law enforcement 
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as this. It is quite clear that 
the effects o f  Mapp are still being felt and will continue to be felt in law 
enforcement procedures, attitudes, and techniques. As the then commissioner 
o f the largest police force in this country I was immediately caught up in the 
entire problem o f  reevaluating our procedures, which had followed the Defore 
rule, and modifying, amending, and creating new policies and new instructions 
for the implementation o f  Mapp. T he problems were manifold. I dwell on the 
details o f  this impact in terms o f  the administration o f a large police force so 
that you may understand that the decisions arrived at in the peace and 
tranquillity o f  chambers in Washington, or elsewhere, create tidal waves and 
earthquakes which require rebuilding o f  our institutions sometimes from their 
very foundations upward. Retraining sessions had to be held from the very 
top administrators down to each o f  the thousands o f foot patrolmen and 
detectives engaged in the daily basic enforcem ent function. H undreds o f  
thousands o f  man-hours had to be devoted to retraining 27,000 men. Every 
hour in the classroom was an hour lost from the basic function o f the police 
department: the protection o f life and property on the street.18
It is noteworthy that the impact on law enforcement in New York State 
was not caused by a change in the law but by the imposition of a sanction, 
albeit a stringent sanction, for a violation of the law.
The Canadian Bill of Rights
T he Canadian B ill o f Rights is restricted in application, having 
the status of a federal statute, applying only to the federal sphere, 
containing only the remedy o f invalidating federal legislation which 
infringes on the rights declared therein.29
As has been seen, the American exclusionary rule developed at 
common law as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. The issue of 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms was before the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Hogan v. The Qjueen30 where the appellant took a breath test 
rather than be charged with refusal even though he was refused permis­
sion to speak to his lawyer who was at the police station before the test 
was given. This refusal was a violation of the appellant’s right to counsel 
pursuant to paragraph 2(c)(ii)31 of the Canadian Bill of Rights. In dissent, 
Laskin J. held that the subsequently obtained breathalizer evidence should 
be inadmissible “when it is obtained following a deliberate violation of a
** Michael J. Murphy, “Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement”, (1966) Texas Law Review 
939 at 941.
*•Canadian Bdl of Rights, section 2: Every law o f Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act 
of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian BUI of Rights, be so 
construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge, infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgement 
o r infringement of any of the rights o r freedoms herein lecognized and declared .. . ”
»•[1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
Sl2 . . . .  no law of Canada shall be construed o r applied so as to 
(c) deprive a person who has been arrested o r detained
(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.
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right o f that person under the Canadian Bill of Rights".32 Recognizing the 
absence of an appropriate remedy in the Bill, Laskin J. argued on basic 
principles o f justice for the development of common law remedies as 
had evolved under the American Bill of Rights:
There being no doubt as to such denial and violation, the Courts must apply 
a sanction. We would not be justified in simply ignoring the breach o f  a 
declared fundamental right or in letting it go merely with words o f  reproba­
tion. Moreover, so far as denial o f  access to counsel is concerned, I see no 
practical alternative to a rule o f  exclusion if any serious view at all is to be 
taken, as I think it should be, o f  this breach o f  the Canadian Bill of Rights.33
The majority o f the Court held that the common law rule enunciated 
in The Queen v. Wray34, that illegally or improperly obtained evidence is 
admissible if relevant, applied.35 Ritchie J., writing the majority opinion, 
summarily dismissed Laskin J .’s argum ent that the breathalizer evidence 
should be excluded on the basis that Laskin J. had relied on the American 
case of Mapp v. Ohio which had no application in the Canadian context.38 
The majority opinions clearly conveyed that the Court would not adopt 
the exclusionary rule for breach of a provision of the Bill of Rights.37 
The result was that Hogan’s right to counsel was unenforceable; the 
Canadian Bill of Rights declared rights but there existed no sanction for 
a violation o f those rights.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
The September draft of the proposed Charter, which was the base 
document for representations before the Special Joint Committee on the 
Constitution of Canada,38 contained in section 26 a provision which could 
allow the gradual development o f an exclusionary rule as had developed 
in the American experience. This section provided:
26. No provision o f the Charter, other than section 13 [provision against self 
crimination] affects the laws respecting the admissibility o f  evidence in any 
proceedings or the authority o f  Parliament or o f Legislature to make laws in 
relation thereto.
3tSupra, footnote 30, at 590. 
Mlbid., at 598.
” [1971] S.C.R. 272.
3iSupra, footnote 30, at 592. 
3*lbtd., at 583.
3,lbtd.. at 584, 585.
3>Supra, footnote 7.
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Section 26 was supported by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of 
Police39 and by the Canadian Association o f Crown Counsels40 which 
argued that the law regarding the admissibility o f evidence should be 
left to “the type of evolution that we have been used to in this country, 
that is a combination of Parliament and the Courts”41.
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association opposed section 26 of the 
draft proposal arguing that rather than providing for the gradual devel­
opm ent o f evidentiary rules, it “enshrines the rule that evidence, even if 
illegally obtained, is admissible if relevant . . .”42. The association stressed 
that section 26 preserved “the Wray rule and the approach of the Court 
in the Hogan case”43. Walter Tarnopolsky, President of the Canadian 
Civil Liberties Association, made the following proposal to the Joint 
Committee in respect o f a remedies provision in answer to a question 
from House of Commons member Irwin44:
Professor Tarnopolsky: We are not suggesting that you substitute the exclu­
sionary rule for Section 26, what we are suggesting is that you have a broad 
remedies clause in which the court could weigh on the one hand the gravity 
o f  the offence, the circumstances and on the other, the seriousness o f  infringe­
ment o f  the Canadian Bill o f  Rights and that there are other remedies that 
might be available.
Mr. Irwin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow that up because I understood  
you were suggesting in cases o f  any illegal evidence that evidence was not to 
be used in a court o f  law?
Professor Tarnopolsky: No, we have not gone that far, but on the other hand 
we do not want to see the rule continue that the evidence is admissible, which
is really what has been tried in the Hogan case..........If I could draw to your
attention another one which is to be found in a study by the Manitoba Law 
Reform Commission on a possible bill o f rights. That, too, has a remedies 
clause which is very broad, which is basically that the courts should have the 
power to grant whatever writs, remedies, directions, orders, payment o f com­
pensation is necessary for the proper compensation o f anyone injured by 
infringement o f  the bill. In other words, that kind of a positive remedies 
clause.45
The need for including a remedies clause in the Charter has been 
argued on the basis that Canada’s experience with the Canadian Bill of 
Rights indicates that a declaration of rights without enforcement provi­
sions cannot protect those rights. Mewett,46 writing in this vein, stated:
“ Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence o f the Special Joint Committee (Minutes o f Proceedings),
November 27, 1980, Vol. 14 at 8.
*°Ibtd., at 11.
“ Minutes of Proceedings, November 18, 1980, Vol. 7 at 15.
43Ibtd., at 27.
44Ron Irwin, Liberal Member o f Parliament, Sault Ste. Marie.
4*Sm̂ to, footnote 42, at 27, 28.
4*A. W. Mewett, “Entrenching the Enforcement of Rights", 23 Crtm. LQ. 129.
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What is infinitely more important is the practical, effective way o f  helping the 
individual secure protection against the de facto abuse o f  those rights and 
freedom s by individuals, by bureaucrats, and by the system itself.47
In section 24 of the final draft of the Charter the Joint Committee 
adopted the type o f enforcement mechanism advocated by Tarnopolsky 
and Mewett. The Charter also contains, in section 52,48 a remedy 
comparable in effect to section 2 of the Canadian Bill of Rights49 providing 
that any law inconsistent with the provisions o f the Charter is invalid.
When the Federal Government made the recommendation to the 
Joint Committee that the Constitution Act be amended by adding section 
24(1) and (2) as the enforcem ent provision, E. G. Ewaschuk of the 
Department of Justice explained the intent of the government in respect 
o f subsection 24(2) as follows:
So what this clause is doing is taking the dissent in Wray, it was a 5-4 judgm ent, 
and would say no, in relation to constitutional violations if  the court finds the 
admission o f  the evidence, having regard to all o f  the circumstances, would 
bring the administration o f  justice into disrepute, then they shall exclude it.40
Thus the Charter contains a broad remedies provision to be interpreted 
and developed by the courts as applications are made for redress o f any 
infringement o f a right guaranteed by the Charter. And the Charter also 
contains an explicit statement that in certain limited circumstances the 
sanction to be applied is the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation 
of a constitutional right.
Undoubtedly these provisions will have a real impact on law enforce­
ment. As the Charter is implemented there will be challenges to the 
reasonableness of police actions.51 The immediate impact will result from
"Ibid., at 130.
**Constitution Act, 1981, s. 52(1): The Constitution o f Canada is the supreme law of Canada and any 
law that is inconsistent with the provisions o f the Constitution is, to the extent o f the inconsistency, 
o f no force or effect.
(2) The Constitution of Canada indudes:
(a) the Canada Act, induding this Act.
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in Schedule I ; and
(c) any amendment to any Act o r order refered to in paragraph (a) or (b).
"Supra, footnote 29.
*®Minutes of Proceedings, January 29, 1981, Vol. 48 at 124.
“ Under the Canadian Bill o f Rights the issue most litigated has been denial of right to counsel in the 
context of a dem and for a breath test pursuant to s. 235 o f the Cnmmal Code. The num ber o f these 
cases creates a distortion in Canadian Bill of Rights case law in that this litigation does not reflect 
the allegations o f infringements that could have been made on consideration o f the area o f rights covered 
by the Bill. The reason for this litigation is that denial of counsel constitutes reasonable excuse pursuant 
to s. 235(2) to refuse to u k e  the test. (Broumridge v. The Queen, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417) This caae law indicates 
that challenges to police actions will be made when there is a possibility of obtaining some desired 
result. The possibilities for redress under section 24 provide sufficient reason for challenges to be made 
to police actions under the Charter.
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the simple fact that questions will be asked, regardless of the answers 
given. This is why, in spite of the probability of vast differences in the 
applications of the Canadian and American exclusionary rules, that the 
conclusion can be drawn that the experience in Canada as the Charter is 
being implemented will be similar to the experience of Michael Murphy 
and other State Police Commissioners in the United States as they imple­
mented the sanction imposed by the decision in Mapp.
The experience, o f course, can have positive results. Kamisar, a 
writer on constitutional-criminal topics, has stated:
It was not until the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary evidence 
rule in 1961 that most police recognized the requirements o f  the Fourth 
Amendment and its state counterparts as binding rules upon their conduct.
Mapp generated serious discussions about how to develop lawful arrest, search, 
and seizure practices into the training sessions and police manuals o f  American 
law enforcem ent in a way that had rarely occured before.51
UNREASONABLE SEARCH OR SEIZURE 
The Scope of the Section 8 Guarantee
Section 8 of the Charter is stated as follows:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
The right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure is not 
newly conferred by the Charter; it has been described by prom inent 
Canadian writers on Criminal procedure as “fundamental”53 and “firmly 
rooted in the common law”.54 However, this common law right has been 
generally accepted to mean that any search or seizure authorized by law 
is reasonable per se.5i It is clear from the Minutes of Proceedings of the 
Joint Committee that it was the intention of the drafters o f the final 
version of the provision that this common law right be extended.
The September draft of the Charter contained the search and seizure 
provision in the following form:
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to search or seizure except on  
grounds and in accordance with procedures established by law.56
M“Mondale on Mapp”, (1976-77) 3 Civil Liberties Review 6:62, at 64.
“ Stanley A. Cohen, Due Process o f Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1977), at 89.
“ Roger E. Salhaney Q.C., Canadian Criminal Procedure (Toronto: Canada Law Book Limited, 1978) at
51.
%lLevih. v. Ryan (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 182 (Ont. C.A.): Minutes of Proceeding», November 18, 1981, Vol.
7 at 11; Magnet, "Spot Checks” vs Charter: Roadside Justice”, Toronto Globe and Mcul, January 7, 1982
at 7.
“ Minutes of Proceedings, November 18, 1980, Vol. 7 at 11.
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Alan Borovoy, General Counsel to the Canadian Civil Liberties Associa­
tion, described the September version to the Joint Committee as a “verbal 
illusion in the sense that it may pretend to give us something, but in 
fact, gives us nothing more than we already have.”57 He suggested the 
wording which appeared in the final version of the Charter “so as to 
create an opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the law itself’.58 
Thus, under the Charter a search or seizure permitted by law will not be 
immune from challenge.
Another issue raised before the Joint Committee concerning the 
scope of section 8 was in respect o f the need to include a specific 
reference to premises as that which appears in the American Fourth 
Amendment.56 An amendm ent was proposed by NDP Member of Parlia­
ment for Burnaby, Svend Robinson, which would have added the words 
“or property” to the section because the provision “could be interpreted 
narrowly to mean that we are strictly speaking about the person. . .”80. 
The Justice Minister, the Honorable Mr. Chrétien, described the por- 
posed amendment as a “unnecessary addition” adding that “I am told 
that it might be under particular circumstances interpreted to restrict the 
meaning rather than to expand the meaning.”81 Mr. Roger Tassé, Deputy 
Minister o f the Department of Justice, elaborated, stating:
. . .  if we were to restrict it in the way that Mr. Robinson in his amendment 
proposes it might have the effect o f  curtailing or restricting the right that is 
guaranteed by clause 8 in this way, that in the United States similar provisions 
have been interpreted to cover voice communications, telephone conversation, 
and in effect if we were to restrict it to the seizure o f  persons or property we 
might leave out the possibility that a court would in the future say that this 
clause does in effect extend to the interception o f  voice communications.*1
A question also raised before the Joint Committee concerned the 
interpretation of the word “everyone”. Consensus before the Committee 
was to the effect that “everyone” would not be “restricted to natural 
persons”83 but would include corporations, including multinational cor­
porations.84
Parliamentary intention in respect of section 8 of the Charter as 
revealed in the Minutes of Proceedings before the Joint Committee was 
that the Charter provision would have the broad scope of the American
57Ibid., at 12. 
stIbid.
‘•Question asked by W arren Allmond. Liberal member of Parliament for Notre-Dame-de Grace, supra, 
footnote 7, Minutes o f Proceedings, December 11, 1980, Vol. 24 at 53.
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Fourth Amendment regarding protection of property and that it would 
permit challenges to the reasonableness of all searches or seizures, even 
if provided by law. The interpretation to be given by the Courts remains 
to be seen.
A Canadian Law of Search and Seizure
New York State law enforcers under Police Commissioner Michael 
M urphy65 faced problems in implementing the existing law and in inter­
preting the effect of case law86 but it was possible for them to determine, 
for the most part, the existing American law of search and seizure. The 
federal Courts had been applying the exclusionary rule for almost fifty 
years,67 during which time the law of search and seizure had developed 
and was collated and published in texts such as the comprehensive two- 
voluine edition of Searches, Seizures and Immunities68 which was available 
in 1961 as the exclusionary rule was being implemented. The Canadian 
law of search and seizure is not so readily available. Because illegally 
obtained evidence has been admissible, there has been no incentive to 
challenge violations of rights in the obtaining o f the evidence. It was the 
exclusionary rule that had “fueled the development of Fourth Amend­
ment law”.69 The relevant Canadian law is only sketchily developed and 
only briefly set out in general criminal procedure texts.70
Although the Charter provides for security against unreasonable, and 
not unlawful, search or seizure, the implementation of the Charter de­
mands that we attempt to define the Canadian law since the legality or 
illegality of any such act is material to its reasonableness. In doing so, it 
is possible to make cautious use o f that accessible body of American law. 
Laskin C.J.C. commented on the use of decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court in reference to provisions of the Canadian Bill of Rights 
as follows:
T he Court has found such decisions to be helpful in the past and remains 
receptive to their citation, but they do not carry any authority beyond persu­




"Joseph  A. Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961). Note also the 
publication in 1978 o f a three-volume treatise Search and Seizure, Wayne Le Fave (St. Paul: West 
Publishing, 1978). A book written for law enforcement officials is The Law o f Arrest Search and Seizure by 
J. Shane Creamer, (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, T hird Edition 1980).
*•Supra, footnote 26.
7tSupra, footnotes 53, 54; Cohen at 89-96, Salhaney at 50-64. 
n Morgantaler v. The Queen (1975), 30 C.R.N.S. 209 (S.C.C.) at 224.
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When using American case law it is necessary to examine the context in 
which the decision was made. For example, in Search and Seizure, Volume 
27*, the author refers to United States v. Crowder73 as a leading case in 
respect o f search of a person. In that case a Court order had been made 
for the surgical removal of a bullet from the forearm of Crowder, the 
judge holding that such minor surgery can be a justified intrusion in 
some circumstances. When a warrant was granted by Laganiere J.S.P. of 
Quebec for a similar surgical removal o f a bullet in reliance on the 
American case law,74 Hugessen J. o f the Quebec Court of Queen’s Bench 
ordered the warrant quashed as illegal and issued without jurisdiction. 
Hugessen J. pointed out that in the United States the Federal Criminal 
Rules of Practice provide for the issuance of a search warrant for a person 
or place75 but that in Canada there is no corresponding authority for 
the search of a person in the Criminal Code.76 He concluded:
. .  .Even if  the operation were minor, and the evidence is that it is not, I 
would not be prepared to sanction it and I do  not do so. T he Crowder case 
may or may not be the law in the United States; it is not the law in Canada.77
There is an immediate need in Canada for collection and consider­
ation o f existing case law with reference to American case law as a 
supplement when the basis for the American decision can be justified in 
the Canadian context. This will be attempted in this article only in respect 
o f the common law right of search or seizure. The task is made difficult 
by the arrested development o f Canadian case law on search and seizure 
issues and the uncertainty as to the degree of acceptability of the decisions 
and concepts that have developed in the American case law.
Common Law Right To Search Persons
The basic principles of the common law right to search persons are 
summarized in general criminal procedure texts.78 Such a right exists 
only as an incident of arrest and only for the purposes o f finding weapons 
that could be used against the arresting officer or others or to effect 
escape79 or for the purpose of preventing the destruction of evidence of 
the offence for which the person has been arrested.80 The validity o f the
7tSupra, footnote 68, Lc Fave, at 14.
T,543 F.2d 312 (D C. Circ. 1976).




7*Supra, footnotes 53, 54.
7*Gottshalk v. Hutton  (1922), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 289 (Alta. C.A.) at 302.
**Reynen v. Antonenko (1975), 30 C.R.N.S. 135 (Alta. Sup. Ct.) at 142.
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search depends upon the searcher having reasonable and probable grounds 
for believing it necessary, the existence o f reasonable and probable 
grounds being a question o f fact.81 The validity of the search necessarily 
depends on there also being reasonable and probable grounds for the 
arrest.
Some American jurisdictions have found it necessary to supplement 
the common law right of search by legislation. The Ouimet Report (1969)82 
refers to “stop and frisk” statutes passed by some American states au­
thorizing “a police officer to stop a person in a public place where he 
reasonably suspects that such a person is committing, has committed, or 
is about to commit a felony, dem anding his name, address, and an 
explanation o f his conduct”83. The search is for weapons only and is 
based on the officer’s reasonable suspicion that he is in danger of physical 
injury.84 The Ouimet Report recommends that such legislation not be 
implemented in Canada because Canadian arresting powers are wider 
than in the United States, and because the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in Canada.85
If in Canada such legislation is not passed, what is the law in the 
situation described in Terry v. State of Ohio88 in which a police officer who 
had patrolled a particular area of downtown Cleveland for 30 years 
became suspicious of two men who “didn’t look right”87 to him? The 
police officer concluded after a period of observation that they were 
about to rob a store. He accosted them, identified himself, asked their 
names, got only a mumbled response, and then grabbed and searched 
each man in turn, relieving each of a revolver and bullets. The search 
was not an incident of arrest and the officer had no authority by statute
tlRegina v.Jewers (1972), 6 C.C.C. (2d) 301 at 303.
**Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1969).
,slbtd., at 57.
•4Laws of New York, Criminal Procedure Law, 140.50 as amended: Temporary questioning of persons 
in public places; search for weapons
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police
officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such oficer’s 
employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed o r is about to 
commit either (a) felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his 
name, address and an explanation of his conduct.
3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police 
officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger o f physical injury, 
he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article o r substance readily capable 
o f causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding 
persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, o r any other property possession of which he 
reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the 
completion o f questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, o r arrest such 
person.
,gSupra, footnote 82 at 57.
••88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
"lbtd., at 1871.
190 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
to effect such a search since Ohio had not passed “stop and frisk” 
legislation. On a motion to suppress the evidence of possession of fire­
arms as being illegally obtained, the United States Supreme Court refused 
to apply the exclusionary rule. The rationale was that the 4th amendment 
does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only unreasonable searches 
and seizures.88 The C ourt stated that the test for reasonableness is 
“balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search 
entails.”89
Although the ratio of the Terry decision would be applicable in the 
Canadian context in that an infringement o f rights in both American 
and Canadian constitutions is based on reasonableness, such application 
would solve only the issue of the constitutionality of the search. The 
search may still be illegal as not authorized by statute or by common law 
since the suspicion may not have amounted to reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest. As the light of the Charter is turned on their actions, 
law enforcement officials will need direction as to the precise criteria for 
the existence of reasonable and probable grounds ana answers concern­
ing the legality of their actions not provided by the ratio in the Terry 
judgm ent.
An unresolved issue regarding search o f persons is the limit of 
acceptable intrusion within the body. In Reynen v. Antonenko90 a rectal 
search for drugs was permitted where there were reasonable and prob­
able grounds to believe the drugs were thus being carried, where the 
police believed the suspect was co-operating, and where no particular 
force was required. In Re Laporte and the Queen,91 the Quebec Court of 
Q ueen’s Bench quashed a warrant ordering surgical removal of bullets 
and expressly withheld comment on whether “the common-law right of 
search might extend as far as minor medical procedures such as the 
taking of a blood test or examination by x-ray. . .”92.
Seizure of the Person
Section 9 of the Charter provides that everyone has the right not to 
be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. Most issues involving seizure of a 
person would be argued as possible violations of the section 9 guarantee.
However, the term “detained” has been narrowly interpreted in 
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Rights that a person arrested or detained must not be deprived “of the 
right to retain and instruct counsel without delay". In Brownridge v. The 
Queen93 Pigeon J. in dissent, defined detention as follows: “Detained 
means held in custody as is apparent from such provisions as s. 15 of 
the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 19/0, c. 1-2”. This definition of Mr. Justice 
Pigeon was quoted in the majority judgem ent of Ritchie J. in Chromiak 
v. The Queen,94 where it was held that a motorist required to take a 
breath test at a roadside screening device was not detained within the 
meaning of the Bill o f Rights. Ritchie J. stated that “any person detained 
within the meaning of the section is one who has been detained by due 
process of law.”95
In Terry v. State of Ohio96 W arren C. J., writing for the majority, 
stated:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Am endm ent governs “seizures” o f  the person 
which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for 
crime, “arrests” in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever 
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, 
he has “seized that person”.*7
It may be that there will be situations of seizure of a person that do 
not fall within the scope o f section 9 but may be argued as coming within 
the scope o f the section 8 provision.
Common Law Right to Search Premises
For premises as for persons the right to search without a warrant 
must be as an incident of arrest, and only to find weapons that may 
cause injury or be used to effect escape, or to prevent the destruction of 
evidence. The precise limits of the right to search premises as an incident 
of arrest have received very little consideration in Canadian case law.
The American law on warrantless searches of premises has become 
more specific because of litigation engendered by the exclusionary rule. 
The general principle is that the common law right to search premises 
extends only to the “area within the immediate control” of the person 
arrested.98 Chimel v. California99 provides a review of the law relevant to
“ 7 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (S.C.C.).
•«[1980] 1 S.C.R. 471.
•*,I b i d at 478.
**Supra, footnote 86.
"Ibid., at 1877.
••Chimel v. California, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969) at 2040.
-Ibid.
192 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL •  REVUE DE DROIT U.N.-B.
warrantless searches of premises. In Chimel, after a person was arrested 
in his home for burglary of a coin shop, the police conducted a one 
hour search o f the entire three-bedroom house. The coins confiscated 
during the search were subject to the exclusionary rule. Although the 
restriction in Chimel has been liberally interpreted,100 search o f premises 
as an incident o f arrest is confined generally to the area from within 
which a person arrested “might gain possession o f a weapon or destruc­
tible evidence”101.
Problems arose in America case law regarding the extent of the 
Fourth Am endment guarantee. Security of one’s home was certainly 
within the provision, but what about a friend’s home, a business office, 
or a telephone booth? A measuring stick was provided by the judgm ent 
in Katz v. United States, 102 a case in which a conviction for transmitting 
wagering information in violation o f a federal statute, based on evidence 
obtained by an electronic listening device attached to a public telephone 
booth, was reversed. Stewart J. held that the definition o f constitutionally 
protected areas, the basis of the parties’ arguments, was not at issue. He 
stated:
For the Fourth Am endm ent protects people, not places. What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own hom e or office, is not a 
subject o f  Fourth Am endm ent protection. But what he seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.103
Harlan J. gave further articulation to what has become known as the 
“expectation o f privacy” rule:
My understanding o f the rule is that there be a two-fold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation o f  privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
"reasonable”.104
The Katz test o f expectation o f privacy has been applied as the scope 
of Fourth Amendment protection has been defined. The issue in United 
States v. Chadwick105 was whether a warrantless search was permitted of 
a double-locked footlocker seized by federal narcotics agents who had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the footlocker contained narcotics. 
The search was not made until the footlocker had been transported to
‘••Steve Emanuel and Steven Knowles, Cnmmal Procedure (New Rochelle: Emanuel Law Outline, 1980) 
at 44.
1*lSupra, footnote 98 at 2040.
1#,88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
'"Ibid., at 511.
104Ibid., at 516.
1#&97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
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the Federal Building in Boston nearly two hours after the arrest and 
thus not excepted from the requirem ent for warrant as an incident of 
arrest. The evidence thus obtained was excluded. The accused had “man­
ifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public 
examination”,106 a privacy interest which could not be interfered with 
without a search warrant.
American cases involving search o f a person must be used with . 
caution as it is possible to obtain a statutory warrant for such a search 
in the United States but not in Canada.107 American cases involving 
warrantless search o f premises have been decided within the context of 
the basic principles that are accepted in Canada108 and should be ac­
ceptable to Canadian courts. It remains to be seen whether the “expec­
tation of privacy” test defined in K atz109 becomes the measure of the 
scope of the Charter provision. The Chadwick situation was expressly 
covered by the Fourth Amendment which includes the term “effects” in 
its provision. Section 8 o f the Charter is worded in general terms but 
open to such an interpretation.
Seizure of Property During a Common Law Search
It is clear that when a search is conducted of a person or premises 
as an incident of arrest, the arresting officer may seize property that may 
be evidence o f the offence charged, since “the interest of the state in the 
person charged being brought to trial in due course necessarily extends, 
as well to the preservation of material evidence of his guilt or innocence 
as to his custody for the purpose of trial”110. The seizure of property 
without a prior search warrant is limited, however, to property that may 
be used or destroyed by the person arrested.111 Logic would limit such 
a seizure to property within possible reach of the person being arrested, 
which is the Chimelil2 restriction.
In American case law the Chimel restriction has been extended by 
application of the “plain view” doctrine. This doctrine holds that a police 
officer may seize property in his plain view if he has the right to be in
,Mlbid.. at 2483. 
lt7Supra, footnote 76.
"“ T hat is. the search is permitted only as an incident o f arrest and for the same reasons that search of 
a person as an incident o f arrest is permitted.
'oiSufna, footnote 105.
lt0DUlon v. O'Bnen and Davis ^ i877). 16 Cox C.C. 245 at 250. 
l,lSupra, footnote 80. 
l>tSupra, footnote 98.
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a position to have that view.1,3 Thus a registration card with the name 
of the robben victim on it, found on the metal stripping of the car door 
by a police officer who was securing an im pounded car pursuant to 
Police Department regulations, was held to be admissible as evidence 
against the accused. The “plain view” doctrine applies where a justified 
search is m progress, as a search incident to arrest and only where police 
inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence. It does not permit a general 
exploratory search.114
Interpretation of the Term “Unreasonable”
A search or seizure may be unreasonable at its outset, or a reasonably 
begun search or seizure may become unreasonable as the action pro­
gresses.
The need for clear authority before the rights of an individual can 
be invaded is the ratio o f the decision in Colet v. R . 115 in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the “extraordinary powers to search 
dwelling houses, property and/or persons”, could not be implied from a 
statutory provision but must be “spelled out with particularity”116. The 
Canadian Supreme Court was addressing the question o f legality and not 
reasonableness. An issue that will surely be raised under the Charter is 
that o f determining if a search not authorized by law can be held in any 
circumstances to be reasonable. The American case, Terry v. State of 
Ohio, 117 was decided on the ratio that an illegal search could be held to 
be reasonable within Fourth Amendment standards.
In order for a search to be lawful according to statute, there must 
exist reasonable and probable grounds for the belief that such a search 
is necessary.'18 Logic and American case law hold that where the search 
is at common law the same burden of proof must be met. A search as 
an incident of arrest is valid only if reasonable and probable grounds 
exist so that a warrant would have been issued on the information which 
enabled the law enforcement officers to a c t."9
"•V/nm* United Suites, 88 S. (,i. (1967) 992 at 993.
"*lhid.
"•'(1981) I9C .R  (3d) 84.
"*lhid.. ai 88. 89.
1' 7Supia, footnote 8 6
""Sectkmi 443. Criminal Code, R.S.C.. 1970. c. C-34.
""'lTiis tost was enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963) at 414, in reference to a 
warrant lor anesl but has been applied in reference to search warrants, as in Katz v. United States, supra, 
liMitnnte 10‘2.
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A search lawful at its outset can become unreasonable on the facjs 
as the search progresses. The American test for reasonableness enunci­
ated <n Terry v. State of Ohio based on “balancing the need to search 
agair st the invasion which the search entails”120 would seem applicable 
at th.s point.
This brief consideration of some aspects of the common law of 
search and seizure is meant to serve as an indication of the problems 
that face Canadian law enforcers in defining Canadian law and incor­
porating relevant American case law. The Canadian problem is not 
unique. In spite of the development over time of an extensive body of 
American search and seizure law. Harlan J. of the United States Supreme 
Court recently stated:
From the several opinions that have been filed in this case it is apparent that 
the law of search and seizure is due for ail overhauling. State and federal law 
enforcement officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable 
the present state o f uncertainty, which extends to such an evervday question 
as the circumstances under which police mav enter a man's property to arrest 
him and seize a vehicle believed to have been used in the commission o f a 
crim e.111
APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER REMEDIES
Standing
Subsection 24(1) provides that applications for remedies pursuant to 
subsections 24(1) and 24(2) may be made by “anyone whose rights and 
freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or de­
nied. . This is the basis for challenge enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio, 122 
that is, that individuals who “belong to the class for whose sake the 
constitutional privilege is given”123 can move for suppression of illegally 
obtained evidence.
Standing to object to governmental use of illegally obtained evidence 
was one of the issues in Alderman v. United States124 where a conviction 
for conspiring in the interstate transmission o f murderous threats was 
based on evidence obtained by the electronic surveillance of the place of 
business of one of the conspirators. The court held that a person whose 
conversation was overheard or who owned the premises could apply for
'**Supra, footnote 86, at 1879.
lu Coohdge v. Sru' Hampshire 91 S. Ct. 2022 at 2050
'**Supra, footnote 22.
,t3lbtd.
I,489 S. Ct. 961 (1969).
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suppression of the evidence.125 The judgm ent of White J. stated the 
general rule that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, 
like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted”126. 
Standing is not available to “one who claims prejudice only through the 
use o f evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed 
at somebody else”127. Recently128 the United States Supreme Court af­
firmed the standing requirement stated in Alderman. 129
Procedure
Most American jurisdictions require that objections to the admission 
of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights be presented by 
a pre-trial motion to suppress.130 K. Chasse131 uses the same terminology 
in reference to applications under s. 446(3) of the Criminal Code which 
provides for the disposal of seized property not required as evidence at 
a preliminary inquiry or trial. This application is usually made in the 
context of a solicitor-client privilege with the applicant alleging that the 
property, because of the privilege, could not be used as evidence. It has 
become acceptable in the last few years to make the application as a pre­
trial motion rather than objecting to its admission at the point in the 
trial at which it is presented to the C ourt.132 O f this procedure Chasse 
stated: “. . .we have the beginning of a new procedure under the Code 
— a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence”133. Chasse contended that 
su( h new procedures must be established under the Criminal Code. 134 In 
Re Froats,135 also an application under s.446(3), A rnup J. A. of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal looked for legislative direction, stating:
We were invited in this case to set out our views with respect to the appropriate 
procedures, for the benefit o f the Crown and o f  the legal profession. We do
'” I M , .ii 96«"
,iulbtd.. ,H 967
'"Ibid.. .it 966
'2*Raka\ v. Illinois. ‘*9 S. Ct. 421 at 426.
1 '"Suprtt, footnote 124.
l:,"|eroM Israel, Wavne LeFave, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Limitations (St. Paul: West Publishing
Co.. 19X0).
" " ‘The Solicitor — Client Privilege and Search W arrants" (1977), 36 C.R.N.S. 349.
1 '-Repntt v. ( iitvin: Ex Parte M rrruk  (1970), 3 O.R. 612; Re Presswood and Deliotto v. International Chemalloy
(.••rpoitihon (1977). .'16 C.R.N.S. 322 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
' "Supm. footnote 131, at 355.
" 'I b u l . ai 352.
"  (1977). C.R.N.S. 334 (Ont. C.A.).
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not think it appropriate for us to do so. T he need for considering possible 
legislation is abundandy apparent from cases such as the present, but the 
Courts’ function must De limited to dealing with each individual case as it 
arises.
T he experience with pre-trial motions under s. 446(3) of the Criminal 
Code suggests the need for legislative direction as to the procedure of 
applying for relief provided by section 24 of the Charter.
Application of Subsection 24(1)
For any infringement of the Charter provision guaranteeing securitv 
against unreasonable search or seizure, subsection 24(1) provides for 
application to the court for any remedy “as the court considers appro­
priate and just in the circumstances”.137 The scope of the remedies that 
may be developed by the courts was described by Tarnopolskv in his 
recommendation to the Joint Com m ittee.138 The return  of property 
unconstitutionally seized is a remedy most applicable to a violation of 
section 8 rights and may be an appropriate remedy under subsection 
24(1). The power of the C ourt to order the return of illegally seized 
property was held in Bergeron v. Deschamps139 to inhere in the Courts as 
incidental to its jurisdiction to quash a search warrant on certiorari. 140 It 
would be within the broad discretion granted to the courts by section 24 
to develop that remedy for unconstitutionally seized property.
In accordance with common law rules of evidence,141 however, prop­
erty seized would be retained if it is to be used as evidence in a court 
proceeding. Accordingly, such designated property would not be re­
turned on an application under subsection 24(1) but would be subject to 
the stringent test enunciated in subsection 24(2).
Application of Subsection 24(2)
Subsection 24(2) provides for the mandatory exclusion o f evidence 
where there has been an infringement of a constitutional right and where 
the admission of evidence obtained by that infringement would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. The difficulties o f consistenc y in 
applying such a two-fold test are described by Kamisar who speaks in
"•Ibid., at 348.
137Supra, footnote 3.
'*•Supra, footnote 42, at 27, 28.
**•[ 1978J 1 S.C.R. 243. .
"°lbtd., at 244
141Supra, footnote 34.
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terms of a judge’s threshold for excluding evidence.142 Kamisar describes 
how the exclusion threshold of Earl W arren, Chief Justice of the United 
States, changed over time, how Justices Holmes and Brandeis had con­
sistently low thresholds for exclusion, and how Justice Jackson had a 
consistently high one. Kamisar stated, referring to Mr. Justice Jackson: 
“For him unconstitutional police conduct was not enough, not even 
serious or aggravated unconstitutional conduct. It had to involve physical 
violence as well.”14:f
It would appear from the Minutes o f Proceedings o f the Joint 
Committee144 that it was the intention of the federal Department of 
Justice officials who introduced the provision that there be a high exclu­
sion threshold. When Mr. Ewaschuk,145 appearing for the Department 
of Justice, was asked for a definition of the test “bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute”, he described the required conduct as being 
“very blameworthy, repugnant, very reprehensible”.146
American case law which illustrates this high threshold for exclusion 
exists in a line o f Supreme Court decisions prior to the M app147 decision 
of 1961 in which the issue was the need to overrule a state court decision 
to admit illegally obtained evidence. The test for such a decision has 
become known as the “shtxk the conscience” test.
The policy of the Supreme Court was to respect the authority of the 
States to administer the criminal justice systems within their borders, 
overturning the decisions ot state courts only where the state proceedings 
“offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions 
of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with 
the most heinous offenses.”148
,4tSupra, footnote 26 at 82.
,,3lbui. at 83.
'**Supra, footnote 7.
'4ilbu t, Minutes o f Proceedings, January 29, 1981, Vol. 48 at 124. Mr. Ewaschuk is E. G. Ewaschuk. 
Q.C., Director of the Criminal Law Amendn.ents Section, Department of Justice.
l4*The complete answer given bv Mr. Ewaschuk is as follows: "Well, somebody told me today — I am 
on a task force to revise the rules o f evidence — and Doctor Iellefson from the federal Department of 
justicc is the head o f n and he savs the- test is as articulated by the form er Justice Black in the United 
States that the admission of this evidente would make me vomit, it was obtained in such a reprehensible 
manner. 1 said to Doctor lo llefson, it might be a little tough writing that in, but that is the type of 
<ase, he is savin#, where the conduct is very blameworthy, repugnant, very reprehensible, what the 
|x>lice did in the circumstances and therefore although, and this is the other argument, they being law 
breakers allow anothet lawbieaker, an accused, to go free, that once it has reached this certain level of 
reprehensihility ii should be excluded."
147Supra, footnote 22.
'**Ru<hm v. California 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952) at 208.
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Shortly after the W olf149 decision holding that state courts were not 
subject to the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court considered the case 
of Rochin v. People of California150 where deputy sheriffs, having some 
information that the appellant was selling narcotics, entered the appel­
lant’s home, forced open his bedroom door, and forcibly attempted to 
extract capsules which he had swallowed. Failing in this, they took him 
handcuffed to a hospital where they obtained the capsules by forcing an 
emetic solution through a tube into his stomach against his will. The 
appellant was convicted on the evidence thus obtained. The Supreme 
Court held that the evidence was subject to the exclusionary rule on the 
basis that “[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience”.151 The “shock 
the conscience” test was again considered in Breithaupt v. Abram152 where 
a blood sample was taken from the appellant as he lay unconscious after 
an accident. The Supreme Court held the evidence admissible because 
“there is nothing ‘brutal’ or ‘offensive’ in the taking of a sample of blood 
when done, as in this case, under the protective eve of a physician”153. 
In Canada, Hugessen J. of the Quebec Court of Q ueen’s Bench, has 
questioned the legality o f such a process.154
In Irvine v. People of the State of California, 155 the judgm ent o f Jackson 
J. gives support to Kamisar’s156 attribution to him of a high exclusion 
threshold. In that case, police officers had surreptitiously entered the 
appellant’s home to obtain evidence of gambling activities contrary to 
state law. Using a key they had made, they concealed a microphone in a 
hall, bored a hole in the roof of the house, and strung wires to a 
neighboring garage. They subsequently made other entries moving the 
microphone to various locations in the appellant's bedroom. The evidence 
on which the appellant was convicted was obtained during a month of 
listening to intercepted conversations. The Court upheld the decision in 
Wolf, holding the evidence not subject to the exclusionary rule because 
a required element of “coercion, violence or brutality to the person”157 
was lacking. Clark J., concurring, commented on the difficulties of de­
termining “just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one’s
'**Supra, footnote 16.
IS0Supra, footnote 148.
m Ibtd.. at 209.
IS,77 S. Ct. 408 (1956).
,i3lbid., at 410.
l i*Supra, footnote 74.
' ” 74 S. Ct. 381 (1953).
'**SupTa, f<x>tnote’26 at 82.
157Supra, footnote 155 at 383.
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home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the 
Constitution”158.
A test for conduct which would bring the administration o f justice 
into disrepute and require the exclusion of evidence thus obtained was 
enunciated by Lamer J. of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rothman v. 
The Queen. 159 In Rothman the appellant was arrested on a charge of 
possession of narcotics for the purpose o f trafficking. He explicitly 
refused to make any statement to the police. A statement was subse­
quently obtained, by a police officer in casual dress who was placed in 
the cell with the appellant and who convinced the appellant that he was 
not a police officer. The majority of the court held that the statement 
was admissible at trial because it was not subject to the special rules for 
admissions made to persons in authority, the test for “persons in author­
ity” being subjective. Lamer J. held that a statement so acquired should 
be excluded if its admission would bring the administration to justice 
into disrepute. This situation did not qualify, however, according to the 
test enunciated by Lamer J. which was as follows:
The Judge, in determining whether under the circumstances the use o f the 
statement in the proceedings would bring the administration o f justice into 
disrepute, should consider all o f  the circumstances o f the proceedings, the 
manner in which the statement was obtained, the degree to which there was 
a breach o f  social values, the seriousness o f  the charge, the effect the exclusion 
would have on the result o f the proceedings. It must also be borne in mind 
that the investigation o f  crime ana the detection o f criminals is not a game to 
be governed by the Marquess o f Queensbury rules. T he authorities, in dealing  
with shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes o f  necessity 
resort to tricks or other forms o f deceit and should not through the rule be 
hampered in their work. What should be repressed vigorously is conduct on 
their part that shocks the community. That a police officer pretend to be a 
lock-up chaplain and hear a suspect’s confession is conduct that shocks the 
community; so is pretending to be the duty legal aid lawyer eliciting in that 
way incriminating statements from suspects or acused; injecting pentothol into 
a diabetic suspect pretending it is his daily shot o f insulin and using his 
statement in evidence would also shock the community; but generally speaking, 
pretending to be a hard drug addict to break a drug ring would not shock 
the community; nor would, as in this case, pretending to be a truck driver to 
secure the conviction o f  a trafficker; in fact, what would shock the community 
would be preventing the police from resorting to such a trick.180
The tests in the American line of cases and in Rothman are based on 
the same concept although in application the test enunciated by Lamer 
J. would be less stringent in that it did not require the element o f physical 
violence which was a requisite for a successful application to the American 
court. It is possible, however, that the “shock the community” test in 
Canada would result in a high exclusionary threshold. In a comparison
IS'(198I) 59 C.C.C. (2d) 30 (S.C.C.).
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of Canadian and American awareness of individual rights an American, 
Katz, stated in reference to Canadians:
There has been, at least until very recently, a general insensitivity to police 
misconduct in conducting searches. . . . the issue o f where police powers end 
and individual rights take precedence is not high in the consciousness o f the 
legal community. Neither is it so among the press nor among the general 
public.1,1
It is difficult to dispute the conclusions of this American commentator 
when we consider that Canadians have accepted as part of Canadian law, 
the granting of writs of assistance162 which give law enforcers a blanket 
warrant to search for particular things anywhere and at any tim e.163 The 
Fourth Amendment clause was largely the result o f colonists’ concern 
with the sweeping powers granted agents of the King under writs of 
assistance,164 but the writs have caused little public outcry in Canada in 
spite of being so susceptible to challenge that the Department of Justice 
has now imposed a moratorium on their issuance.165
In M app v. Ohio166 the Supreme Court rejected “the confusing ‘shock 
the conscience’ standard of the Wolf and Rochin cases,167 opting for the 
certainty of applying a mandatory exclusionary rule when evidence is 
unconstitutionally obtained. This inflexible application of the exclusion­
ary rule has been under considerable attack168 and there is recent evi­
dence in case law169 of successful attempts to limit its application.
Somewhere between the adoption of an absolute exclusionary rule 
and the reliance on the “shock the conscience of the community” test is the 
“balancing interests” test as enunciated in a line o f Scottish-Irish cases 
referred to by Laskin J. in Hogan v. The Queen. 170
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In Hogan, Laskin J., in dissent, would exclude breathalizer evidence 
obtained in deliberate violation o f the appellants’ right to counsel as 
declared in the Bill o f Rights, indicating a lower threshold for exclusion 
than that enunciated in cases decided on the basis o f shocking the 
community.171
The alternative to the rule in Wray proposed by Laskin J. is that the 
courts “balance the competing interests by weighing the social interest in 
the particular case against the gravity or character of the invasion, leaving 
it to the discretion o f the trial judge whether the balance should be 
struck in favour o f reception or exclusion o f particular evidence”172. The 
basis o f the test is the same as that enunciated in Rothman.173 The 
reference to the Scottish-Irish cases suggests a difference in application 
in that exclusion would result from imbalance alone and not from an 
imbalance sufficient to shock the community.
The line of Scottish and Irish cases referred to by Laskin J .174 has 
been reviewed and commented on by Heyden, The Criminal Law Review175 
and by Peiris, Ottawa Law Review.176 Both articles extract from these cases 
the factors to govern the exercise of the courts discretion to exclude 
evidence. The questions to consider in determ ining whether improperly 
obtained evidence should be excluded are listed by Heyden as:
1. Did the irregularity occur as a vital part of a deliberate attempt to 
get the evidence, or did it happen accidentally?
2. How serious was the illegality?
3. Were there circumstances of urgency or emergency?
4. Were those responsible for the illegal conduct public officials or mere 
private individuals?
5. How easy would it have been to obey the law?
6. How serious is the offence being inquired into?
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7. How important were the particular means used in the detection of 
the type o f crime committed?” 7
The case Lawrie v. Aiuir178 is usually referred to as the leading case 
in this line of authority. Jeanie Lawrie, a dairymaid, was convicted of 
using milk bottles not her own in violation o f a municipal regulation. 
The evidence on which she had been convicted was obtained by inspectors 
for the Milk Marketing Board who obtained her consent to search her 
shop by showing an invalid warrant. On a balancing of the “relative 
importance of the public interest and the protection of the individual”,179 
the evidence was excluded and the conviction quashed.
In his judgment Lord Justice-General (Cooper) stated:
Irregularities require to be excused, and infringements of the formalities of 
the law in relation to these matters are not lightly to be condoned. Whether 
any given irregularity ought to be excused depends upon the nature of the 
irregularity and the circumstances under which it was committed.180
A case decided on the same principles is Gordon Hay v. Her Majesty's 
Advocate181 in which teeth marks were left on the breast o f a young girl 
who had been m urdered and raped. A suspect was taken to a dental 
hospital for teeth impressions under the first Scottish warrant for the 
search of a person. On the basis o f Lawrie v. M uir the court held such 
evidence admissible “even if there had been some irregularity in the 
method by which it was obtained”182.
THE IMPACT OF THE CHARTER ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
In representations to the Joint Committee, the spokesman for the 
Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police183 and the spokesman for the 
Canadian Association o f Crown Counsels184 expressed their concern 
about the inclusion in the Charter o f a discretion to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence. Their principal objection was that such a discretion 
when exercised by individual trial judges would result in a degree of
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uncertainty unacceptable in the trial process.185 In the Mapp decision, 
the United States Supreme Court opted for the certainty of an absolute 
exclusionary rule. If a constitutional right was infringed in any way, 
evidence obtained in violation of that right would not be admissible.186 
In the Wray decision, the Supreme C ourt o f Canada opted for the 
certainty of admitting illegally obtained evidence, if relevant. The discre­
tion in Canada to exclude illegally obtained evidence has been so limited 
since Wray as to be non-existent in most circumstances.187 The Canadian 
Parliament, in reference to violation of Constitutional rights, has now 
opted for the compromise in subsection 24(2) o f the Charter. There is no 
question that the Charter option will lead to a degree o f uncertainty 
regarding the admissibility of any illegally obtained evidence, no matter 
how stringent the test for bringing “the administration of justice into 
disrepute”.
In addition, Canadian law enforcement officials will have to contend 
with applications made under the broad remedies provision o f subsection 
24(1). Pursuant to this section a court may grant appropriate remedies 
for any infringement of a constitutional right. No matter how restrictive 
the court is in the development and granting of such remedies, the fact 
that section 24(1) will be invoked means that law enforcement officials 
will be called upon to justify their actions. When we consider the diffi­
culties o f determining the precise limits of a law that is is only generally 
defined, the degree of uncertainty which must be faced is increased.
In general, the legal rights188 entrenched by the Charter have long 
existed at common law. The American experience after Mapp, however, 
indicates that it was not a change in the law which created the impact at 
that time, but the imposition of a remedy for violation o f that law.189 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains remedies that will 
create in law enforcement and the administration of justice a Canadian 
version of the “tidal waves and earthquakes”190 suffered by the New 
York Police Department after Mapp.
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